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DUNWODY DISTINGUISHED LECTURE IN LAW
WHAT’S WRONG WITH QUALIFIED IMMUNITY?
John C. Jeffries, Jr.*
I. WHAT IS “QUALIFIED IMMUNITY?”
Qualified immunity protects government officers from damages liability
for violating constitutional rights. It does not constrain injunctions,
exclusion of evidence, or the defensive assertion of rights in government
enforcement proceedings.1 Nor does it apply to all damage actions. Officers
performing legislative, judicial, and certain prosecutorial functions have
absolute immunity from the award of money damages.2 At the other
extreme, local governments, which can be sued only for constitutional
violations committed pursuant to official policy or custom,3 have no
immunity at all for such violations.4 But executive officers—including law
enforcement officers of all sorts, prison guards, school officials, health care
providers, welfare administrators, and government employers—generally
enjoy qualified immunity from the award of money damages. That is true
both for state and local officers sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and for
federal officers sued under the analogous common-law remedy of Bivens v.
Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics.5 Qualified
* David and Mary Harrison Distinguished Professor, the University of Virginia School of
Law. Thanks go to James McKinley and George Rutherglen for comments and to Wells Harrell for
expert research assistance.
1. See generally John C. Jeffries, Jr. & George A. Rutherglen, Structural Reform Revisited,
95 CAL. L. REV. 1387 (2007).
2. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976) (recognizing absolute immunity for
those prosecutorial acts “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process”);
Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553–55 (1967) (recognizing absolute immunity for judicial acts);
Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 379 (1951) (recognizing absolute immunity for legislative
acts).
3. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690–91 (1978) (holding localities liable for
official policy or custom).
4. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 638 (1980) (declaring no immunity for local
governments).
5. 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971) (authorizing damages actions for illegal search and seizure by
851
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immunity is thus the most important doctrine in the law of constitutional
torts. It states the general liability rule for damage actions seeking to
vindicate constitutional rights.
So what is “qualified immunity”? Qualified immunity is the doctrine
that precludes damages unless a defendant has violated “clearly
established” constitutional rights.6 More fully, damages are barred if “a
reasonable officer could have believed” his or her actions to be lawful “in
light of clearly established law.”7 This sounds simple enough, and there is
every reason to suppose that the Supreme Court originally thought it so.
Indeed, at one time, qualified immunity had two prongs: an objective
requirement of reasonable grounds for believing one’s conduct lawful and a
subjective requirement of actual good-faith belief in the legality of that
conduct.8 The subjective branch proved troublesome. Given the broad
discovery standards in civil litigation, plaintiffs could rummage around in a
defendant’s background to find evidence suggestive of malice or bad faith.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court lopped off the subjective branch, leaving
only the requirement of “objective reasonableness of an official’s conduct,
as measured by reference to clearly established law.”9 Though conceptually
amputated, the resulting doctrine was justified precisely on the ground that
the pared-down focus on “clearly established” rights could be easily
administered, usually on pre-trial motion.
The Supreme Court’s effort to have more immunity determinations
resolved on summary judgment or a motion to dismiss—in other words, to
create immunity from trial as well as from liability10—has been largely
successful.11 Ease of administration has proved more elusive. In fact,
determining whether an officer violated “clearly established” law has
proved to be a mare’s nest of complexity and confusion. The circuits vary
widely in approach, which is not surprising given the conflicting signals
from the Supreme Court. The instability has been so persistent and so
pronounced that one expert describes qualified immunity as existing “in a
perpetual state of crisis.”12
federal officers).
6. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (emphasis added).
7. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987).
8. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247–48 (1974) (generalizing the defense of “good faith
and probable cause” recognized in Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 557 (1967)).
9. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.
10. Cf. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 525 (1985) (characterizing qualified immunity for
purposes of interlocutory appeal as “an entitlement not to stand trial under certain circumstances”).
11. That is not to suggest that it has been uncontroversial. For criticism of the Court’s effort to
secure pre-trial resolution and the conflict with the usual goal of adjudication on fully developed
facts, see generally Alan K. Chen, The Facts About Qualified Immunity, 55 EMORY L.J. 229 (2006).
12. Chaim Saiman, Interpreting Immunity, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1155, 1155 (2005); accord
Charles R. Wilson, “Location, Location, Location”: Recent Developments in the Qualified
Immunity Defense, 57 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 445, 447 (2000) (“Wading through the doctrine of
qualified immunity is one of the most morally and conceptually challenging tasks federal appellate
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One can gather some sense of the depth of the problem from the
complexity of the efforts to resolve it. A good example comes from the
Eleventh Circuit. After a 2002 course correction by the Supreme Court,13
the Eleventh Circuit reformulated its approach into a three-stage inquiry
that categorizes conduct based on its relation to precedent.14 First is a
category of “obvious clarity,” in which the relevant constitutional provision
is “so clear and the conduct so bad that case law is not needed to establish
that the conduct cannot be lawful.”15 The Eleventh Circuit insists that
“obvious clarity” must be based specifically on the words of the law in
question, though one may wonder whether there are any constitutional
provisions whose text is quite that clear. This category may be a nearly
empty set. For a second category of cases, the court turns to “broad
statements of principle [that] are not tied to particularized facts.”16 Such
broad, categorical pronouncements can create “clearly established” law for
“a wide variety of later factual circumstances.”17 In the third, and by far the
largest, category, the court looks for “precedent that is tied to the facts.”18
For precedents in this category, the question is whether the instant case is
“fairly distinguishable.”19 If so, the law is unclear, and qualified immunity
is upheld. If not, the law is “clearly established,” and qualified immunity is
denied.
In my view, the Eleventh Circuit’s current blueprint for identifying
“clearly established” law is one of the best of several such attempts.20
Others are even more elaborate.21 Still, one cannot help but notice the
complexity of this edifice. There are three categories of “clearly
established” law. None is self-executing. Indeed, all require evaluative
judgments—including, for example, just how textually specific “obvious
clarity” must be; whether pronouncements of broad principle are or are not
deemed tied to particular facts; and whether a precedent found to be
court judges routinely face.”).
13. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 735–36, 744, 748 (2002) (rejecting the Eleventh Circuit’s
prior approach of requiring a “materially similar” precedent to create “clearly established law”).
14. Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1350–51 (11th Cir. 2002).
15. Id. at 1350.
16. Id. at 1351.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 1352.
20. Karen Blum, an acknowledged expert in the field, has expressed a similar opinion. See
Erwin Chemerinsky & Karen M. Blum, Fourth Amendment Stops, Arrests and Searches in the
Context of Qualified Immunity, 25 TOURO L. REV. 781, 791–92 (2009) (describing Vinyard as a
“very good structure for deciding when the law is clearly established”).
21. See, e.g., Brown v. Muhlenberg Twp., 269 F.3d 205, 220 (3d Cir. 2007) (Garth, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (suggesting a four-factor analysis for determining whether
rights are clearly established); Michael S. Catlett, Note, Clearly Not Established: Decisional Law
and the Qualified Immunity Doctrine, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 1031, 1055–62 (2005) (proposing a five-part
procedure for answering that question).
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factually grounded is or is not “fairly distinguishable” from the case at
hand. Anyone who has survived the first year of law school knows that
none of these questions is easy. The cumulation of debatability as one
moves through these questions means that even this well-crafted test for
“clearly established” law will be fodder for argument, unclear in
application, and unsuccessful in predicting results.
II. THE PROBLEMS WITH QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
So what exactly is wrong with qualified immunity? What makes it so
difficult? Why is the search for “clearly established” law a source of so
much confusion and instability, rather than the straightforward, easy-toapply standard that the Supreme Court originally envisioned? There are at
least three problems. The first is the level of generality at which “clearly
established” is assessed. The second is the question of which courts count
in determining whether a right is “clearly established.” And the third is a
dysfunctional interaction between the law of qualified immunity, as
currently stated, and the content of certain constitutional rights. Each of
these issues is examined below and illustrated through decided cases—
some of which require fairly full description. Only by looking at the
doctrine in application can one see just how problematic qualified
immunity has become.
A. Generality
The problem of generality—or, if you prefer, altitude—concerns the
level of abstraction at which “clearly established” is assessed. When the
Supreme Court first spoke on this point, it seemed to require that the law be
clearly established on the ground—that is, at a level of specificity that
would give practical guidance to a street-level official. Thus, in Anderson
v. Creighton, the Court rejected abstract formulations, noting “that the right
the official is alleged to have violated must have been ‘clearly established’
in a more particularized, and hence more relevant, sense: The contours of
the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would
understand that what he is doing violates that right.”22 This is the language
of legal realism, presupposing that the application of general principles to
particular facts is not known until a court has spoken. That may be true.
But the fact-specific, on-the-ground approach does not mesh with the
rhetoric of constitutional law or with the antecedent methodology of the
common law. Only rarely—Brown v. Board of Education,23 Miranda v.
Arizona,24 Roe v. Wade25—does the Supreme Court say something
22.
23.
24.
25.

Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987).
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
384 U.S. 436 (1966).
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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completely new. More commonly, the Court’s opinions look backward to
prior decisions through the mediation of general principles. Specific rulings
are typically described as being implicit in the propositions laid down in
earlier cases. This rhetorical posture follows the methodology of the
common law, which reasons analogically from prior decisions and (to an
extent) necessarily generalizes their holdings. Thus, despite the Court’s
injunction to look for “clearly established” law in a “more particularized”
sense, it is natural for lawyers and judges to find meaning and guidance in
generalizations drawn from prior decisions.26
The level of generality is crucially important. A couple of examples will
show just how radically the altitude of analysis can affect results. At one
extreme is Callahan v. Millard County,27 a Tenth Circuit decision reviewed
by the Supreme Court under the name of Pearson v. Callahan.28 At issue
was the validity of “consent once removed” to justify the warrantless search
of a home. The question arises when an undercover agent posing as a drug
user is invited into a dealer’s home to make a purchase. Entry is lawful
because of consent. Once inside, the agent sees illegal drugs, which
furnishes probable cause for arrest. The trouble is that the undercover agent
cannot safely make the arrest alone, so he completes the purchase, then
calls on officers waiting outside to enter the dealer’s home and arrest him.
The consent given to the undercover agent is deemed transferred to the
waiting officers, hence “consent once removed.”
When a panel of the Tenth Circuit considered this theory, there was no
local precedent on point. There were, however, decisions from other
circuits upholding such searches29 and no authority directly to the contrary.
The Tenth Circuit ruled the search illegal, apparently because the
undercover agent was a civilian informant rather than a police officer.30
The Tenth Circuit also ruled that the defendants lacked qualified immunity
and thus had to pay damages to the drug dealer, despite the judicial

26. For insightful exploration of the jurisprudential dimensions of finding “clearly
established” law, see generally Saiman, supra note 12.
27. 494 F.3d 891 (10th Cir. 2007).
28. 129 S. Ct. 808 (2009). The Supreme Court decision is discussed in John M. Beermann,
Qualified Immunity and Constitutional Avoidance, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 139 and John C. Jeffries, Jr.,
Reversing the Order of Battle in Constitutional Torts, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 115.
29. See, e.g., United States v. Pollard, 215 F.3d 643, 648–49 (6th Cir. 2000) (justifying police
entry once the defendant “admitted [an] undercover officer and informant” who established probable
cause); United States v. Bramble, 103 F.3d 1475, 1478 (9th Cir. 1996) (invoking consent-onceremoved “where an undercover agent is invited into a home, establishes the existence of probable
cause to arrest or search, and immediately summons help from other officers”); United States v.
Diaz, 814 F.2d 454, 459 (7th Cir. 1987) (applying the doctrine “where the agent (or informant)
entered at the express invitation of someone with authority to consent, at that point
established . . . probable cause . . . and immediately summoned help from other officers”).
30. It is not clear why that should matter, but the merits of the Fourth Amendment ruling are
not the issue here.
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authority declaring such searches legal. The officers, said the court,
violated the clearly established “right to be free in one’s home from
unreasonable searches and arrests.”31
No wonder the Supreme Court reversed.32 At the Tenth Circuit’s level
of generality, all rights are clearly established. Lofty abstractions about the
“right to be free in one’s home from unreasonable searches and arrests” are
long-standing and completely familiar. If that is all it takes to make a right
clearly established, virtually everything is. If followed generally, this
approach would effectively eliminate the defense of qualified immunity
from the law of constitutional torts.
At the other extreme are cases finding rights clearly established only
when captured in precedent factually on point. A older line of cases from
the Eleventh Circuit requiring precedents “materially similar” to the case at
hand nicely fits that description,33 but lest I seem ungrateful to my hosts
here in Florida, let me single out for criticism a decision from my own
state, the Commonwealth of Virginia. In Fields v. Prater,34 the Fourth
Circuit reversed a decision denying qualified immunity to members of the
Buchanan County Board of Supervisors. The supervisors were sued for
denying employment to the plaintiff on grounds of her political affiliation.
The alleged facts—taken as true for the purposes of this decision—were
that the plaintiff worked as a social worker and then as the officer manager
of the Buchanan County Department of Social Services; that she applied
for the position of director of that agency when it became open in 2006;
that she was interviewed by a board specially constituted for that purpose;
and that the interviewing board ranked her first among seven candidates for
that position. Subsequently, the County Board of Supervisors dissolved the
interviewing board and appointed their own representatives to fill the
vacant post. The new group did not choose the plaintiff, who was a longtime affiliate and supporter of the Republican Party. They chose instead the
candidate ranked dead last among the seven original applicants and—no
doubt coincidentally—the only candidate actively affiliated with the
Democratic Party. The plaintiff alleged that the Democrats on the board
had cooked the books to prevent her from being hired in violation of her
First Amendment rights.
The Fourth Circuit agreed with the district court that plaintiff’s
31. 494 F.3d at 898.
32. 129 S. Ct. at 813.
33. The narrowness of this approach has led some to call the Eleventh Circuit the circuit of
“unqualified immunity.” See Elizabeth J. Norman & Jacob E. Daly, Statutory Civil Rights, 53
MERCER L. REV. 1499, 1556 (2002). The most sustained and intense criticism of Eleventh Circuit
qualified immunity decisions (through 2002) appears in Mark R. Brown, The Fall and Rise of
Qualified Immunity: From Hope to Harris, 9 NEV. L.J. 185, 197–202 (2008) (discussing cases in
which minor factual differences from prior cases precluded liability even in the face of “patent
wrongs” and “horrendous facts”).
34. 566 F.3d 381 (4th Cir. 2009).
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allegations stated a constitutional claim. They could scarcely have done
otherwise. The constitutional illegitimacy of partisan political
considerations in governmental hiring and firing decisions has been clear
for decades.35 The only question was whether the job plaintiff sought was
the type of position (usually called policymaking) for which “the hiring
authority can demonstrate that party affiliation is an appropriate
requirement for the effective performance of the public office involved.”36
After reviewing Virginia law, the court found that the county director of the
social services was not such a job. Policy was set mostly by the state and
secondarily by the county board of social services, to which the director
reported. The job plaintiff sought, therefore, was an ordinary administrative
position to which the constitutional protections against partisan political
considerations fully applied.
The Fourth Circuit found, however, that plaintiff’s right against political
discrimination was not clearly established and that the defendants were,
therefore, immune from damages liability. This conclusion flowed from a
lack of directly applicable precedent. There was a Fourth Circuit decision
saying that Virginia electoral boards could not consult political affiliation
in appointing county registrars37 but nothing dealing directly with Virginia
directors of social services. The court, therefore, found that the
applicability of First Amendment principles to plaintiff’s position was
sufficiently unclear to preclude damages liability.
All this sounds plausible enough until one recognizes that state law,
which created and defined the position of county director of social services,
explicitly required that the position be nonpartisan. Regulations issued by
the Virginia State Board of Social Services specified that political
affiliation could not be considered, a point reiterated in a handbook
provided to all county board members by the state. Indeed, the job
application completed by the plaintiff and the other candidates carried a
prominent declaration that the position was to be filled without regard to
political affiliation.38
So, we are left to ask, How could county board members reasonably
have believed that they could “demonstrate that party affiliation is an
appropriate requirement”39 for the director of social services, when they
35. See Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 375 (1976) (Stewart, J., concurring) (prohibiting
discharge of “nonpolicymaking, nonconfidential government employee” on grounds of political
affiliation); Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 517 (1980) (reaffirming and extending Elrod); Rutan v.
Republican Party of Illinois, 497 U.S. 62, 79 (1990) (making clear that Elrod and Branti applied to
“promotion, transfer, recall, and hiring decisions based on party affiliation and support”).
36. Branti, 445 U.S. at 518.
37. McConnell v. Adams, 829 F.2d 1319, 1324 (4th Cir. 1987).
38. All this is recounted in Fields, 566 F.3d at 386–89, in the context of demonstrating that
the position was not one for which partisan political considerations could legitimately be taken into
account.
39. Branti, 445 U.S. at 518.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2010

7

Florida Law Review, Vol. 62, Iss. 4 [2010], Art. 1

858

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62

had repeatedly and authoritatively been told that it was not? It is true, of
course, that the application of First Amendment principles to government
employment is a matter of federal law, but it is equally true that the
position at issue was created and defined by state law. The federal
constitutional prohibition against taking political affiliation into account in
filling non-partisan positions was crystal clear, and the state’s
determination that local social services employees were nonpartisan
positions was also crystal clear. Indeed, it was well publicized in the
handbook and on the application. How two explicit and unambiguous rules
could add up to a lack of clarity remains a mystery. All that was lacking
was a prior Fourth Circuit decision saying that two plus two equals four.
For the lack of such a precedent, the law was found not “clearly
established.”
The decision is so grudging that it is difficult not to wonder whether it
might have been motivated by hostility to the underlying right, a
consideration properly above the pay grade of Fourth Circuit judges. In any
event, the Fourth Circuit’s demand for precedent precisely on point reduces
the search for clearly established law to something like a snipe hunt. When
precisely applicable precedent cannot be found, qualified immunity
expands beyond all sensible bounds and goes a long way toward disabling
the damages remedy for violations of constitutional rights.
B. Sources of “Clearly Established” Law
The second problem in ascertaining established law exacerbates the
first. Since “clearly established” must be sought in sources more specific
than abstract principles, where may such sources be found? The obvious
answer is binding precedent—decisions of the Supreme Court, of the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the circuit where the issue arose, and of the U.S.
district court for cases in that district. But what about the decisions of other
circuits? Or other districts? Or those of state courts? In short, what are the
sources that count in determining whether a right is “clearly established”?
Not surprisingly, the circuits disagree. The Eleventh Circuit limits the
sources of “clearly established” law to decisions of the Supreme Court, of
the Eleventh Circuit, and of the highest state court of the jurisdiction.40
Other circuits are willing to look beyond the law of their circuit, sometimes
grudgingly as in the Sixth Circuit,41 and sometimes quite broadly. The
40. Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1351 n.22 (11th Cir. 2002) (“‘[W]hen case law is
needed to ‘clearly establish’ the law applicable to pertinent circumstances, we look to decisions of
the U.S. Supreme Court, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, and the
highest court of the pertinent state.’” (quoting Marsh v. Butler County, 268 F.3d 1014, 1032 n.10
(11th Cir. 2001))).
41. See, e.g., Walton v. City of Southfield, 995 F.2d 1331, 1336 (6th Cir. 1993) (“[I]t is only
in extraordinary cases that we can look beyond Supreme Court and Sixth Circuit precedent to find
‘clearly established law.’”).
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Ninth Circuit will apparently accept “whatever decisional law is
available,”42 including decisions of other circuits, state courts, district
courts, and even unpublished district court opinions.43 The First, Fifth,
Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits are similarly latitudinarian.44
The narrower the category of cases that count, the harder it is to find a
clearly established right. Thus, a restrictive approach to relevant precedent
beefs up qualified immunity and makes its protections more difficult to
penetrate. Under the Eleventh Circuit’s approach, a right would have to be
squarely established over and over again, in circuit after circuit, before
violations could routinely be vindicated by awards of money damages
nationwide. In my view, this is too restrictive. When a narrow view of
relevant precedent is added to the demand for extreme factual specificity in
the guidance those precedents must provide, the search for “clearly
established” law becomes increasingly unlikely to succeed, and “qualified”
immunity becomes nearly absolute.
C. The Interaction Between Qualified Immunity and Constitutional
Rights
The third problem is the lack of fit between qualified immunity doctrine
and the content of certain rights. I have argued elsewhere that a systemic
weakness of constitutional tort doctrine is its attempt to treat all rights the
same.45 In fact, there are significant differences among constitutional rights
in structure, aim, and the availability of alternative remedies. It follows that
one-size-fits-all often does not fit. Qualified immunity illustrates the point.
The search for clearly established law works best for rights stated in
relatively specific rules and doctrines. When stable, such doctrines yield
clearly established law. When the rules change, the new law is not clearly
established—and thus not sufficient to support money damages—until
government actors have had the benefit of the clarifying decision.46 In such
areas, the chief effect of qualified immunity is to avoid damages liability
for failure to anticipate developments in the law.
Qualified immunity works less well for other rights. It works least well
when constitutional doctrine is stated at a very high level of generality
42. Capoeman v. Reed, 754 F.2d 1512, 1514 (9th Cir. 1985).
43. See, e.g., Drummond v. City of Anaheim, 343 F.3d 1052, 1060 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Even
‘unpublished decisions of district courts may inform our qualified immunity analysis.’” (quoting
Sorrels v. McKee, 290 F.3d 965, 971 (9th Cir. 2002))).
44. See Diana Hassel, Excessive Reasonableness, 43 IND. L. REV. 117, 125–26 (2009)
(reviewing and citing cases from those circuits); Catlett, supra note 21, at 1048 (describing the
broad approach and citing cases).
45. See generally John C. Jeffries, Jr., Disaggregating Constitutional Torts, 110 YALE L.J.
259 (2000); Jeffries, supra note 28.
46. This is the rationale for merits-first adjudication in constitutional tort actions, a point
developed at some length in Jeffries, supra note 28.
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unaccompanied by particularizing doctrine. As applied to those rights,
qualified immunity can be analytically troubling. The Eighth Circuit
noticed the problem early on in Anderson v. Creighton, in which the
legality of a warrantless search depended on probable cause and exigent
circumstances. The Eighth Circuit denied qualified immunity on the ground
that the right against warrantless searches absent exigent circumstances was
clearly established.47 The Supreme Court reversed, stating that the
unlawfulness of the officers’ conduct had to be clearly established at a
“more particularized, and hence more relevant sense.”48 In dissent, Justices
John Paul Stevens, William J. Brennan, and Thurgood Marshall objected to
the “double standard of reasonableness” in applying qualified immunity to
Fourth Amendment claims.49 Allowance for reasonable error was already
built into the underlying constitutional standard because probable cause
depends on what the officers reasonably believed about the facts before
them. Allowing the officers to invoke reasonableness again in claiming
qualified immunity “‘if they reasonably (though erroneously) believed that
they were acting reasonably is to confuse the jury and give the defendants
two bites at the apple.’”50
Despite its oxymoronishness (to coin a word), reasonably
unreasonable51 behavior is not an empty concept. As Justice Antonin Scalia
pointed out,52 it is analytically possible to be reasonably mistaken about any
legal standard, even one couched in terms of reasonableness. The point
would be easy to see, Scalia noted, if the Fourth Amendment had used a
different word, such as forbidding “undue” searches and seizures.53
There is certainly no logical contradiction in asking whether an officer
could be reasonably mistaken in thinking that a search was or was not
undue. If that were a close call, a mistake could be reasonable.
Yet despite the fact that there is nothing conceptually impossible about
applying qualified immunity to constitutional claims based on
47. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 637–38 (1987), rev’g Creighton v. St. Paul, 766
F.2d 1269 (8th Cir. 1985).
48. Id. at 640.
49. Id. at 648 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
50. Id. at 664 n.20 (quoting Llaguno v. Mingey, 763 F.2d 1560, 1569 (7th Cir. 1985) (en
banc)).
51. Cf. id. at 659 (“I remain convinced that . . . ‘an official search and seizure cannot be both
“unreasonable” and “reasonable” at the same time.’” (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897,
960 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment and dissenting in part))). The concept of reasonable
unreasonableness has sparked criticism and debate. See, e.g., Lisa R. Eskow & Kevin W. Cole, The
Unqualified Paradoxes of Qualified Immunity: Reasonably Mistaken Beliefs, Reasonably
Unreasonable Conduct, and the Specter of Subjective Intent that Haunts Objective Legal
Reasonableness, 50 BAYLOR L. REV. 869, 870–71 (1998).
52. 483 U.S. at 641 (majority opinion).
53. Id. at 643.
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reasonableness, there is a serious practical problem lurking in these cases.
Its marker is not the use of “reasonableness” in the underlying
constitutional right, nor indeed any particular form of words. The problem
lies, rather, in the architecture of a constitutional right that is 1) defined at a
high level of generality; 2) in terms meant to take all relevant
considerations into account; and 3) without resort to particularized rules
and doctrines that clarify and define the right. For rights having this
architecture, an independent role for qualified immunity is hard to
understand and even harder to justify. The premier—though not the only—
example of such a right is the constitutional protection against excessive
force. The Supreme Court has said that such claims should be analyzed
under the Fourth Amendment.54 The test is one of “objective
reasonableness,” which “requires careful attention to the facts and
circumstances of each particular case, including the severity of the crime at
issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the
officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting
to evade arrest by flight.”55 These factors are not to be assessed “with the
20/20 vision of hindsight” but from the perspective of a reasonable officer
on the scene at the time with whatever information is then available. So
defined, the constitutional standard for excessive use of force would seem
to encompass all relevant concerns, including reasonable mistakes that an
officer might make about whether the suspect was armed, whether he posed
a risk to the officer, whether he would be dangerous to others if he got
away, etc. Indeed, the Supreme Court’s definition of “objective
unreasonableness”
might
plausibly
be
called
“subjective
unreasonableness,” as it turns so heavily on the individual actor’s
knowledge and situation.
Given that the underlying right incorporates all these potentially
exculpatory considerations, the role of qualified immunity in excessive
force cases is not at all obvious. One might have thought that qualified
immunity would simply merge into the merits. If, taking all the limitations
on the officer’s time, information, and perceptions into account, the
officer’s use of force was “objectively unreasonable,” arguably there would
be no need for an independent inquiry into whether a reasonable officer
could have believed such conduct to be lawful.
In fact, the Ninth Circuit (and others) took just this approach, only to be

54. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989) (“[A]ll claims that law enforcement
officers have used excessive force—deadly or not—in the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or
other ‘seizure’ of a free citizen should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment . . . .” (emphasis
omitted)).
55. Id. at 396 (identifying the question as “whether the totality of the circumstances justified a
particular . . . seizure” (quoting Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1985))).
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told by the Supreme Court that they had it wrong. In Katz v. Saucier,56
involving a rather trifling excessive force claim brought by a political
protestor, the Ninth Circuit denied summary judgment and scheduled the
case for trial to resolve disputed facts. The Supreme Court all but
unanimously reversed,57 insisting that the excessive force and qualified
immunity inquiries were different and had to be kept distinct. It was true
that the excessive force standard required “deference to the judgment of
reasonable officers on the scene” and the avoidance of hindsight.58 As the
Court put it, “If an officer reasonably, but mistakenly, believed that a
suspect was likely to fight back, for instance, the officer would be justified
in using more force than in fact was needed.”59 Qualified immunity,
however, added something more:
The concern of the immunity inquiry is to acknowledge that
reasonable mistakes can be made as to the legal constraints on
particular police conduct. It is sometimes difficult for an
officer to determine how the relevant legal doctrine, here
excessive force, will apply to the factual situation the officer
confronts. An officer might correctly perceive all of the
relevant facts but have a mistaken understanding as to whether
a particular amount of force is legal in those circumstances. If
the officer’s mistake as to what the law allows is reasonable,
however, the officer is entitled to the immunity defense.60
In application, this is irreducibly murky. If, taking all exculpatory
considerations into account, an officer’s use of force has been found
objectively unreasonable, and if the legal standard is that objectively
unreasonable force is unconstitutional, it is hard to see what reasonable
exculpatory belief the officer could have entertained. If the officer
reasonably believed in mistaken facts, the conduct would not be objectively
unreasonable. But if the conduct is objectively unreasonable, how could an
officer reasonably believe it legal? It is plain, of course, that the Saucier
Court wanted summary judgment. The Justices thought the Ninth Circuit
should have been more forward in precluding trial of an excessive force
claim that had precious little to support it. With that conclusion, one may
well agree. But the notion that the police officers needed some additional
clarification of the law is puzzling.
But that’s what the Supreme Court said. So what are the lower courts to
56. 194 F.3d 962 (9th Cir. 1999). Saucier involved a federal defendant sued under the
authority of Bivens rather than 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but the immunity doctrine is the same.
57. Justice David Souter joined in the Court’s discussion of qualified immunity but thought
that the case should be remanded for application of that standard. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194,
217 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
58. Id. at 205 (majority opinion).
59. Id.
60. Id.
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do? If, as Saucier and other cases indicate,61 borderline excessive force
claims should be resolved in favor of defendants before trial, and if courts
are still bound by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,62 which push
borderline cases to trial, what should lower courts do? How are they to
achieve pre-trial resolution of doubtful cases under summary judgment
rules that schedule doubtful cases for trial? The answer is to frame the
substantive standard of “clearly established” law in a way that facilitates
summary judgment. Harlow v. Fitzgerald63 began that strategy, and recent
interpretations of “clearly established” vastly extend it. As we have seen,
they require not only that the use of force be objectively unreasonable but
also that there has been specific precedent declaring a comparable use of
force objectively unreasonable on similar facts. If “clearly established” law
requires a prior ruling on similar facts, then defendants will be entitled to
summary judgment whenever there happens to be no binding precedent
precisely on point.
This solves the summary judgment problem but only by grossly
distorting qualified immunity. If “clearly established” law requires factually
similar precedent, excessive force will be actionable only when there
happens to be a controlling decision factually on point. Under that
approach, many instances of wholly unjustified use of force will be
effectively immune from redress. Take, for example, Snyder v.
Trepagnier.64 James Snyder was in a car stopped for speeding after a highspeed chase. Snyder jumped out of the car and ran into a swamp. An officer
caught up with him when Snyder became stuck in the mire, perhaps
hampered by the fact that he had only one arm. The officer shot him in the
back at very close range, leaving him paralyzed from the waist down.
Snyder was unarmed. The jury found, by special verdict, that the officer
had been objectively unreasonable in using deadly force but that he “had a
reasonable belief that his actions would not violate Snyder’s constitutional
rights.”65 With respect, it is hard to see how both conclusions could be true.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address that issue but subsequently

61. See, e.g., Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 201 (2004).
62. Sometimes, at least, the Court speaks as if the usual rules apply. See, e.g., id. at 195 n.2
(“Because this case arises in the posture of a motion for summary judgment, we are required to view
all facts and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party . . . .”).
63. 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
64. 142 F.3d 791, 794 & n.1 (5th Cir. 1998). The case is unusual in that the qualified
immunity determination was made by a jury, but it nicely illustrates the difficulty of requiring
specific precedents in excessive-force cases. Snyder has attracted a good deal of attention. See
Eskow & Cole, supra note 51, at 883–84; see generally Harvey S. Bartlett III, Comment, “The
Swamp’s a Hell of a Place to Die, Ain’t It?”: How Objective Reasonableness Has Stagnated the
Flow of Fourth Amendment Deadly Force Law at Its Juncture with the Qualified Immunity Defense,
74 TUL. L. REV. 301 (1999) (discussing Snyder).
65. 142 F.3d at 800–01.
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dismissed the writ as improvidently granted.66 So far as we can tell,
therefore, a use of deadly force found objectively unreasonable based on
what the officer knew and did under the circumstances at the time could
nevertheless be protected by qualified immunity.67 The justification for that
result is, to me, obscure. After all, the only law the officer need have
known is that the use of deadly force must be reasonable in light of the
facts known to him at the time.68
An even better example is Willingham v. Loughnan, decided by the
Eleventh Circuit in 2001.69 Betty Willingham was shot twice by police
officers engaged in a confrontation with her brother on her front lawn. She
screamed at them, called for help, and threw several objects, including
bottles and a kitchen knife, at the police (or at their dog). A jury concluded
that she threw a knife at the officer and convicted her of battery and
attempted second-degree murder. When she subsequently sued under
§ 1983, a second jury found the use of deadly force objectively
unreasonable and awarded her more than $5 million in damages, including
punitives. The Eleventh Circuit accepted the jury’s conclusion on excessive
force but reversed on qualified immunity. The question, as described by the
court, was astonishingly specific:
[W]hether Defendant Officers violated clearly established
federal law in 1987, by shooting Plaintiff within a “split
second” after she attacked two officers—having just tried to
kill one of them—while she, at the moment, was not in the
physical control of the police and was standing unarmed but
near the area from which she had already obtained four
objects she had used as weapons, at least one of which was a
potentially lethal weapon.70
This question was answered in favor of qualified immunity because “in
1987 it was not clearly established that it constituted excessive force to
shoot a person under the circumstances presented in this case.”71 Of course,
if the police officers had been reasonable—not necessarily accurate—in
believing that she currently posed a threat to them, the shooting would not
have been objectively unreasonable in the first place. Given that deadly
force was found to be objectively unreasonable—meaning that they shot
66. Id. at 791, cert. granted, 525 U.S. 1098 (1999), and cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1083 (1999).
67. See id. at 800 (“[Q]ualified immunity is available as a defense to monetary liability for an
objectively unreasonable use of excessive force under the Fourth Amendment.” (quoting Brown v.
Glossip, 878 F.2d 871, 873–74 (5th Cir. 1989))).
68. Of course, to say that the jury’s findings seem incompatible is not to say which one was
right. Conceivably the jury’s error was in finding the shooting objectively unreasonable in the first
place rather than in concluding that the officer could reasonably have believed the shooting lawful.
69. 261 F.3d 1178 (11th Cir. 2001).
70. Id. at 1186.
71. Id. at 1187.
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her when she posed no immediate threat—it is far from clear how the
officers could reasonably have believed their actions lawful. The search for
a precedent specific to “the circumstances presented in this case” sets an
almost impossible standard for “clearly established” law, effectively
precluding vindication of constitutional rights through money damages.
What is lacking here, it seems to me, is a sense of “common social
duty.”72 The phrase comes from Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, who used
it to suggest how we know not to commit crimes. We all know that the law
is written down somewhere—at least it is supposed to be. But we also
know that it is fanciful to assume that ordinary citizens have access to the
statutes that define criminal offenses or to the volumes of decisions that
interpret them or that, if they did, they would have the skill or aptitude to
understand such materials.73 People go to three years of law school to learn
how to do that. The “notice” given in these technical legal documents is, in
most circumstances, both fictitious and superfluous. The truth is that
criminals simply should know better. They learn this from the society in
which they live, not from studying prior decisions (which is why the excuse
of “rotten social background” is, in some cases, not entirely unappealing).
In much the same way, police should have a “common social duty” not
to use excessive force. No specific legal precedent should be required to
tell the police officer in Snyder that he should not shoot, at a range of fewer
than twelve inches, an unarmed, one-armed suspect who is unable to get
away. Really being ticked off at having to chase someone into a swamp is
not a good enough reason to shoot him. If that is what the officer did, he
should be liable, period, whether or not there is precedent precisely on
point. And the same is true for the police officers in Willingham. If, as the
jury found, the police shot Mrs. Willingham as she stood in her doorway,
having thrown her bottles and her kitchen knife and being currently
unarmed and unable to inflict harm, they should be liable. The award of
money damages should not depend on whether precisely the same thing has
happened before.
I do not wish to be understood as suggesting a lack of concern for police
officers who find themselves in volatile confrontations with obstreperous
citizens. Police are right to fear for their safety. Potentially dangerous
confrontations can develop suddenly, can easily be misunderstood, and
must be handled in an adrenalin-drenched sense of emergency. No one
expects police officers to get everything right. Sad as it may be, there will
be legally justified shootings of suspects who turn out to be unarmed and
undangerous. The Supreme Court is quite right to counsel against hindsight
and to remind judges and juries alike to evaluate these situations from the
perspective of the officer on the scene at the time with whatever limited
72. Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373, 377 (1913).
73. See John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal Statutes,
71 VA. L. REV. 189, 209–11 (1985).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2010

15

Florida Law Review, Vol. 62, Iss. 4 [2010], Art. 1

866

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62

opportunities and information were then available. But if, under this
appropriately deferential standard of liability, the use of deadly force is
properly found objectively unreasonable, qualified immunity should not
preclude recovery of money damages. The idea that officers in such
situations could reasonably believe objectively unreasonable actions (as so
defined) to be lawful because of the absence of precedent precisely on point
is factually false—and should be legally irrelevant.
III. SUGGESTED FIXES
So what should we do? I have two suggestions, both of which are
relatively modest. First, the Supreme Court needs to say explicitly and
openly what has been implicit in its qualified immunity decisions for
twenty years—namely, that its goal in formulating qualified immunity is
chiefly to affect the administration of summary judgment in constitutional
tort actions. Much of the problem with “clearly established” law derives
from the effort to devise a substantive standard so narrowly “legal” in
character that it can be applied by courts on summary judgment or a motion
to dismiss. In my view, this is a mistake. What the Court actually wants—
or should want—is not a liability rule that requires a factually on-point
prior decision but rather an administration of summary judgment that is
more sensitive to the need to resolve weak cases before trial. That, at least,
is my reaction to the Court’s decision in Saucier v. Katz. The case involved
an animal rights activist who wanted to protest at a speech by Vice
President Al Gore. He unfurled a banner and moved toward the speaker’s
platform. Military police grabbed him and took him to a military van,
where, the plaintiff claimed, they used excessive force in shoving him
inside.74 Given his allegations, there was a disputed issue of material fact,
but even if all his allegations had been true, it would have been small
potatoes. The Ninth Circuit’s decision to send the case to trial may have
been consistent with traditional summary judgment practice, but it was
inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s desire to resolve minor cases before
trial. What the Supreme Court really wanted in Saucier was to preclude
putting constitutional tort defendants to the burden of trial in weak cases.
The insistence on factually similar precedent oversolves that problem. It
not only exculpates the military police in Saucier, who were at worst
ungentle, because no precisely similar case had occurred before, but it also
exculpates the officers in Snyder and Willingham, who actually shot
people. Obviously, the law wants to treat serious and insubstantial cases
differently. Traditional summary judgment law largely leaves that
discrimination to the jury, though, in the decades since Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett,75 courts have played (I think properly) an increasingly prominent
74. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 197–98 (2001).
75. 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
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role in performing this function. In constitutional tort cases, the Supreme
Court sees a particular need to weed out weak cases pretrial. If that is what
the Supreme Court wants, that is what the Court should say, directly and
explicitly, rather than trying to tease that result from an artificially narrow
standard of liability.
Some may object that the Supreme Court has no business tinkering with
summary judgment practice in this way. After all, there is an authorized
process for changing the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and it includes
study and recommendation by the advisory committee, opportunity for
public comment, formal approval by the Supreme Court, and notice to
Congress. Whether that objection has compelling force I rather doubt, but,
in any event, it is beside the point. The Supreme Court may not be entitled
unilaterally to alter summary judgment practice as such, but it is surely
entitled to alter the substantive law on which summary judgment is based.
Thus, for example, in defamation cases, the Court has, for substantive
reasons, required “clear and convincing” evidence rather than a mere
preponderance.76 This enhanced standard of proof (presumably) alters
results at trial but it also—and, perhaps, more importantly—restricts the
cases that get to trial.77 Given sufficient justification, it is perfectly
appropriate for the Court to craft rules of law (such as the standard of proof
in defamation) in order to protect defendants from the burdens of trial, as
well as the risk of liability. That, of course, is what the Supreme Court has
done with qualified immunity. It would be helpful, in my judgment, if the
Court were more open and straightforward in saying that the qualified
immunity standard is designed to facilitate pre-trial resolution of doubtful
cases rather than to constrict liability to situations that have occurred
before.78
A second suggestion would be to change the doctrinal formula for
qualified immunity. Rather than asking whether the defendant violated a
“clearly established” right, I would ask whether the defendant’s conduct
was “clearly unconstitutional.” By “clearly unconstitutional,” I mean to
signal that borderline violations would not trigger damages liability (though
76. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285–86 (1964) (“Applying these
standards, we consider that the proof presented to show actual malice lacks the convincing clarity
which the constitutional standard demands . . . .”); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
255–– 56 (1986) (referring to “the New York Times clear and convincing evidence requirement”).
77. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255 (“[T]he determination of whether a given factual dispute
requires submission to a jury must be guided by the substantive evidentiary standards that apply to
the case.”).
78. Ultimately, of course, the Court’s choices on judge-jury allocations are constrained by the
Seventh Amendment. Summary judgment practice as it has developed after Celotex, however,
reveals that the constitutional constraints are not as narrow as might once have been thought. Full
analysis of this issue is beyond the scope of this lecture. It suffices here to say that I contemplate no
new position with respect to the Seventh Amendment. Whatever the grounds exist for reconciling
that provision with current practice would also apply to my proposal. See infra note 84.
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of course other remedies would be unaffected). This basic proposition
aligns with current law, and in many circumstances, there would be no
difference between the formulations. If, for example, there were a change
or development in the law, until the new rule was settled, the law would
not be “clearly established” and conduct violating it would not be “clearly
unconstitutional.” This is the strongest case for qualified immunity, and it
would be covered equally well by either formulation.
The same would be true when the validity of a particular rule or
doctrine is simply unresolved. Pearson v. Callahan is an example.
“Consent once removed” as a justification for warrantless searches had
been approved by other circuits but not by the Tenth. Unless and until the
Tenth Circuit ruled, a “consent once removed” search would not violate a
“clearly established” right nor would it be “clearly unconstitutional.”
Qualified immunity would be upheld under either formulation.
In other circumstances, restating qualified immunity would make a
difference. Asking whether conduct violates a “clearly established” right
directs one’s attention to the search for factually similar precedent and to
the kind of “lawyer’s notice” that technical legal sources provide.79 Asking
whether conduct is “clearly unconstitutional” is less tied to precedent and
less technical. Most importantly, it incorporates the notion of common
social duty. Conduct would be clearly unconstitutional if it contravened
factually specific precedent, as is currently true, or if it clearly and
unambiguously contravened constitutional principles. The nature of the
constitutional violation would matter, whether or not it had previously
arisen on closely similar facts.
The Fifth Circuit has said the fact “that we are ‘morally outraged’, or
the ‘fact that our collective conscience is shocked’ by the alleged conduct
does not mean necessarily that the officials should have realized that it
violated a constitutional right . . . .”80 The statement is narrowly correct.
Moral outrage does not necessarily mean that officers should have known
they were acting unconstitutionally—but neither is it irrelevant. If the
conduct does violate a constitutional right, outrageousness should preclude
qualified immunity, whether or not the specific misconduct has been
adjudicated before.
Thus, for example, I would part company from the Fifth Circuit’s
decision in Doe v. Louisiana, where defendant social workers engaged in a
“nightmarish” “witch hunt” of a father alleged (by them) to have sexually
abused his daughter. The defendants suppressed reports of medical
examinations, misrepresented the results of those examinations, used
deception in obtaining a court order, and knowingly presented false
information to prosecutors. Their charges were completely unfounded.81
79. Jeffries, supra note 73, at 211, 216.
80. Foster v. City of Lake Jackson, 28 F.3d 425, 430 (5th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted).
81. Doe v. Louisiana, 2 F.3d 1412, 1421 (5th Cir. 1993) (King, J., concurring).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol62/iss4/1

18

Jeffries: What's Wrong with Qualified Immunity?

2010]

DUNWODY DISTINGUISHED LECTURE IN LAW

869

Concurring in the judgment upholding qualified immunity, Judge Carolyn
Dineen King said, “That the actions of which Doe complains are egregious,
however, does not mean that he has asserted the violation of a federally
protected right . . . .”82 Again, the statement is technically correct.
Egregiousness does not establish unconstitutionality, but neither should it
be irrelevant to damages liability. In my view, truly appalling
unconstitutional misconduct should not be protected by qualified
immunity. Egregiousness may be irrelevant in the search for “clearly
established” law,83 but it would not be irrelevant in determining whether
conduct is “clearly unconstitutional.”84
CONCLUSION
In short, qualified immunity needs a course correction. The doctrine is
supposed to create a balance between the “competing values [of] the
importance of a damages remedy to protect the rights of citizens [and] ‘the
need to protect officials who are required to exercise their discretion and
the related public interest in encouraging the vigorous exercise of official
authority.’”85 The Court’s attempts to frame that balance may have seemed
sensible in the abstract, but the press of litigation has revealed substantial
defects. Today, the law of qualified immunity is out of balance, particularly
in the context of rights defined generally without particularizing rules and
doctrines, a category of which unconstitutionally excessive force case is
both the clearest and most important example. The Supreme Court needs to
intervene, not only to reconcile the divergent approaches of the Circuits but
also, and more fundamentally, to rethink qualified immunity and get
constitutional tort law back on track.

82. Id.
83. In fact, as Judge Richard Posner has pointed out, egregiousness may cut against finding a
violation of a “clearly established” right, as the “easiest cases” are not likely to have arisen before.
K.H. v. Morgan, 914 F.2d 846, 851 (7th Cir. 1990) (noted in Saiman, supra note 12, at 1189 n.186).
84. There is no reason to think that a “clearly unconstitutional” standard for qualified
immunity would encounter any more or less Seventh Amendment problem than requiring a “clearly
established” right. Both standards can be administered by courts on the same basis.
85. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807 (1982) (quoting Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S.
478, 506 (1978)) (internal citation omitted).
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